Do you really understand the RFID fragile label? Read its core values in depth.
RFID Knowledge

Do you really understand the RFID fragile label? Read its core values in depth.

PublishedShanghai Zejie Smart Technology Co., Ltd.

While RFID fragile labels usually seek to leave the dismantling damaged through materials or structures, “fragile” does not automatically amount to non-replicable, non-transplantable or active reporting.

The value of a breakable label is to leave a trail.

It needs to be clear whether the damage occurs on surface, antenna or connection and whether the damage can be detected at the time of inspection.

If the system only checks the number, broken but readable labels may continue to be accepted; if they are not read at all, no direct inference should be made that they are fake.

The fragile structure should verify the true detachment, including slow stripping, reposting and base-wood damage.

Situations requiring early verification

The same fragile label is placed on glass, the paper box and the rough plastic, which may differ from the tear marks. The test should be about the final base, not just a tear-opened display. In cases where it is still readable but clearly broken, software also needs to be determined in a way that is consistent with manual.

It's recommended that this be verified.

Test the laceration, local destruction and temperature changes on the actual packaging and see whether the physical trace and the reading state together support the determination.

It is recommended that the design be reversed from the act(s) to which it was intended: copying number(s), transplant label(s), counterfeit and internal modification of the record(s) are tested separately.

Identify the number. It's a few steps away from proving it's true.

Reading a valid number only indicates that the system receives a format-compliant identity information; to improve authenticity, authentication of documents, labels and physical bindings, and flow records should continue. The case is strong, reading distance is shorter or labels are difficult to remove, and cannot be a separate alternative to access control and key management.

Change the security promise to a testable attack.

“Security” should describe what is being protected, who is facing it, and what fails. For example, the only way to prevent unwittingly wrongfully taking is different from the design required for those who prevent conditional dismantling and reproduction. Certification can only prove that a document meets the rule, but also requires confirmation that it is not improperly separated from the physical; back-office logs can only prove that the operation was recorded and limit who could modify the log. The more clear the path of attack, the easier it is to find weaknesses, the easier it is to justify the risks that cannot be covered, and to avoid holding one security measure accountable.

From demonstration to delivery, what evidence is needed

Observation dimensions Evidence to be retained
Threated object Make it clear whether the opponent can read and write, dismantle or contact backstage
Credible evidence Cross-validation of certification results and business records
Dismissal disposal Losses, cancellations, bid changes and audit enforceability
This is the key trade-off. Do you want the label to prevent dismantling, or do you want it to be unscathed? Is there a difference between the acceptance of the two objectives?

It's worth asking.

Do you want the label to prevent dismantling, or do you want it to be unscathed? Is there a difference between the acceptance of the two objectives?

Technical and factual references