From the future, the RFID tags protect your property.
RFID Knowledge

From the future, the RFID tags protect your property.

PublishedShanghai Zejie Smart Technology Co., Ltd.

The RFID tags provide identification and access clues to prevent theft, but labelling does not in itself prevent the items from being taken.

Identify the number. It's a few steps away from proving it's true.

Reading a valid number only indicates that the system receives a format-compliant identity information; to improve authenticity, authentication of documents, labels and physical bindings, and flow records should continue. The case is strong, reading distance is shorter or labels are difficult to remove, and cannot be a separate alternative to access control and key management.

The theft prevention is a combination of detection and disposal.

Export reading should be judged in conjunction with the status of sale, receipt or loan. Repeated passages of the same item, multiple passers-by and re-entry of the returned goods challenge a simple “read-to-call” rule.

The false alarm can deplete trust and a long-term, unexplained alarm may eventually be closed.

The effect should be to see the anomalies that are being correctly handled, not just the number of alarms, and to avoid the transfer of identifying pressure to front-line personnel.

Why isn't one success enough?

If the goods are bought legally, then the export rules need to know their state, not the unconditional ones. The more frequent and difficult to explain, the more likely they are to be closed down. The security system must treat misreporting as a core business, otherwise nominal coverage cannot be converted into physical protection.

Change the security promise to a testable attack.

“Security” should describe what is being protected, who is facing it, and what fails. For example, the only way to prevent unwittingly wrongfully taking is different from the design required for those who prevent conditional dismantling and reproduction. Certification can only prove that a document meets the rule, but also requires confirmation that it is not improperly separated from the physical; back-office logs can only prove that the operation was recorded and limit who could modify the log. The more clear the path of attack, the easier it is to find weaknesses, the easier it is to justify the risks that cannot be covered, and to avoid holding one security measure accountable.

Don't just look at the successful samples.

Observation dimensions Evidence to be retained
Threated object Make it clear whether the opponent can read and write, dismantle or contact backstage
Credible evidence Cross-validation of certification results and business records
Dismissal disposal Losses, cancellations, bid changes and audit enforceability
This is the key trade-off. If the people on the scene cannot explain why they called the police, can technology continue to receive user cooperation?

It's recommended that this be verified.

Sets the legal, unauthorized and repeated samples to record the full time from identification to confirmation, disposal.

It is recommended that the design be reversed from the act(s) to which it was intended: copying number(s), transplant label(s), counterfeit and internal modification of the record(s) are tested separately.

It's worth asking.

If the people on the scene cannot explain why they called the police, can technology continue to receive user cooperation?

Technical and factual references