Label Counterfeiting Plant - Custom Counterfeiting Tags to protect your products
RFID Knowledge

Label Counterfeiting Plant - Custom Counterfeiting Tags to protect your products

PublishedShanghai Zejie Smart Technology Co., Ltd.

The delivery of a fraud-proof labelling plant should not be just an impressionable look. Buyers need to know clearly: want to verify the source, find the unsealed, or track the channels?

Prefecation tag customization first determines what to prove.

The identification depends on the document and backstage, the decoupling of the structure, the tracking of the channel, the flow-based records, and not a single common number.

The mapping and unique codings increase the visibility, but in the absence of physical binding and unusual verification, transplants or false records may still occur.

Customized fraud prevention should first determine whether the source is to be proven, unopened or channeled. Different targets require different structures and verification chains, which cannot cover all commitments with a single number. Consumers should also see the conclusions correctly, avoiding decapitating successful queries as an exhaustive risk.

How do border conditions change the conclusion?

Consumers find a real number, and they may still face the transplanted label. If the program does not design physical binding and unusual review, it cannot be written as absolute false or false. The security system should indicate where evidence supports the case and provide manual services to the dispute.

It's recommended that this be verified.

The system is distinguished and processed by replicating the visible content, tag transfer and legal after-sale re-selling test.

It is recommended that the design be reversed from the act(s) to which it was intended: copying number(s), transplant label(s), counterfeit and internal modification of the record(s) are tested separately.

Identify the number. It's a few steps away from proving it's true.

Reading a valid number only indicates that the system receives a format-compliant identity information; to improve authenticity, authentication of documents, labels and physical bindings, and flow records should continue. The case is strong, reading distance is shorter or labels are difficult to remove, and cannot be a separate alternative to access control and key management.

Change the security promise to a testable attack.

“Security” should describe what is being protected, who is facing it, and what fails. For example, the only way to prevent unwittingly wrongfully taking is different from the design required for those who prevent conditional dismantling and reproduction. Certification can only prove that a document meets the rule, but also requires confirmation that it is not improperly separated from the physical; back-office logs can only prove that the operation was recorded and limit who could modify the log. The more clear the path of attack, the easier it is to find weaknesses, the easier it is to justify the risks that cannot be covered, and to avoid holding one security measure accountable.

Don't just look at the successful samples.

Observation dimensions Evidence to be retained
Threated object Make it clear whether the opponent can read and write, dismantle or contact backstage
Credible evidence Cross-validation of certification results and business records
Dismissal disposal Losses, cancellations, bid changes and audit enforceability
This is the key trade-off. Is the programme raising the cost of forgery or is it simply making the process more complex for consumers?

It's worth asking.

Is the programme raising the cost of forgery or is it simply making the process more complex for consumers?

Technical and factual references