Electronic lead seals ' rationale for analysis: achieving full anti-false effects
RFID Knowledge

Electronic lead seals ' rationale for analysis: achieving full anti-false effects

PublishedShanghai Zejie Smart Technology Co., Ltd.

Electronic lead seals may be linked to physical closure and digital identity, but “full security” should be deconstructed as a specific verifiable threat: reproduction, transplantation, debarment and unauthorized replacement.

Full protection from hypocrisy is not a seal that can be independently committed.

Even if the seal itself is credible, the container interface may be unreasonable.

The numbering cannot be used as a final proof of the content.

The sealing does not prove true, either, if it is fully transposed to another object. The entity binds and digital verification should be designed in conjunction. The identification process should indicate which anomalies need to be disabled and reviewed, so as to avoid directly equating the failure to trigger a alarm with all normal.

Situations requiring early verification

The attacker may not copy the chip, but rather transpose the original seal with a part of the package to another item. If the program only validates the number, it will still not be possible to detect a change in the binding relationship. Threat analysis should cover the physical connection to identity, rather than just the safe operation around the chip.

It's recommended that this be verified.

Simulations are visible, wrongly applied and authorized to be opened, checking whether the system gives different conclusions and allowing manual verification.

It is recommended that sealing, hand-over, sealing, unusual opening and change of authorization be completed.

Seal number, unsealed status and transport liability to be judged jointly.

The electronic lead seal provides identification information, and some products provide decoupling or state testing. Both capabilities should be verified separately.

Credible handovers require mutual restraint between entities and records

The sealing record should be connected to the specific container, place of application, operator and time of operation. If only one number is kept, it is difficult to explain what object it has bound; if there are only live photographs, there may be no retrievable fluid connection. Electronicization is the value of linking these evidences instead of replacing any of them. The authorization, when opened, should preserve the cause and the back-and-back sealing relationship, without restoring the apparent normality by deleting the old state. The chain of evidence should be able to express change rather than allowing a permanent state of well-being.

From demonstration to delivery, what evidence is needed

Observation dimensions Evidence to be retained
Physical constraints Whether or not to break the seal will still open the container.
We have a credible status. Disassembly detection separate from number reading to verify
Hand over the evidence. The sealer, the sealer and the reason for it.
This is the key trade-off. Which attacks are the programme claims to have prevented and which are clearly outside its capabilities?

It's worth asking.

Which attacks are the programme claims to have prevented and which are clearly outside its capabilities?

Technical and factual references