Fragile electronic labels: secret weapons for commodity security
RFID Knowledge

Fragile electronic labels: secret weapons for commodity security

PublishedShanghai Zejie Smart Technology Co., Ltd.

Fragile electronic labels can be used as a layer of commodity envelope and identification, but their effects should be evaluated in conjunction with packaging structures, reading and writing rules and back-office records.

Commodity security cannot be left to a label.

The normal valid number itself is not sufficient to prove that the contents of the commodity have not been replaced.

The writing of a false slogan is absolute and easily allows operators to ignore the cost of services authorized for the change of tenders, refunds and miscalculation.

The security measures should be organized around threats: stealing, shifting and labelling require different evidence. A higher reading distance alone will not solve all the risks.

Identify the number. It's a few steps away from proving it's true.

Reading a valid number only indicates that the system receives a format-compliant identity information; to improve authenticity, authentication of documents, labels and physical bindings, and flow records should continue. The case is strong, reading distance is shorter or labels are difficult to remove, and cannot be a separate alternative to access control and key management.

Change the security promise to a testable attack.

“Security” should describe what is being protected, who is facing it, and what fails. For example, the only way to prevent unwittingly wrongfully taking is different from the design required for those who prevent conditional dismantling and reproduction. Certification can only prove that a document meets the rule, but also requires confirmation that it is not improperly separated from the physical; back-office logs can only prove that the operation was recorded and limit who could modify the log. The more clear the path of attack, the easier it is to find weaknesses, the easier it is to justify the risks that cannot be covered, and to avoid holding one security measure accountable.

Re-examine the programme from an exception

After-sale maintenance may require the unpacking of packaging, and if each unseal is permanently marked as a fake, the system will wrongly harm legitimate business. It should distinguish between original seals, authorize unsealing and re-enclosed, and preserve the event chain. Security design not only detects anomalies but also explains the permitted changes.

Put your judgment in the real situation.

The decomposition tests are performed in real packaging, while the return and legal maintenance tagging is performed to verify that the old documents have been cancelled.

It is recommended that the design be reversed from the act(s) to which it was intended: copying number(s), transplant label(s), counterfeit and internal modification of the record(s) are tested separately.

From demonstration to delivery, what evidence is needed

Observation dimensions Evidence to be retained
Threated object Make it clear whether the opponent can read and write, dismantle or contact backstage
Credible evidence Cross-validation of certification results and business records
Dismissal disposal Losses, cancellations, bid changes and audit enforceability
This is the key trade-off. How does the system distinguish between malicious debarment and salaried after legal sale, rather than leaving all anomalies to consumers?

It's worth asking.

How does the system distinguish between malicious debarment and salaried after legal sale, rather than leaving all anomalies to consumers?

Technical and factual references