Why do smart logistics use RFID electronic locks?
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Why do smart logistics use RFID electronic locks?

PublishedShanghai Zejie Smart Technology Co., Ltd.

A lock can limit the door to open, but it does not necessarily answer three cross-examination questions: whether or not it has been opened during the course, while in custody, and whether on-site records can vindicate each other with goods, vehicles, and shipping manifests. Smart logistics introduces RFID electronic locks, which are important for completing evidence rather than adding a chip to the lock.

Pre-recognize: Read the lock, test the lock and remote alarm.

RFID first solves wireless identification. When you place a normal label on a mechanical lock, you can usually only get a sign to the reader, which does not allow for an assertion that the beam is intact and the door is open. To recognize unconnected or unlocked, the product must have the appropriate structure, sensor or circuit design, and the software needs to read and explain its state.

The source RFID electronic seal, the source electronic lock and equipment with a cellular communication or positioning module, may also be reported differently. The passive label does not automatically upload events to the platform because the vehicle is passing through a certain location without entering the active reading and writing range. Some devices save events, others only receive feedback when read on site. The procurement should ask each other how the state was created, whether it could be retained, when it could be uploaded, rather than being subject to a general "whole-watch."

The value of the lock record depends on when the binding takes place.

It is assumed that after a single shipment of goods has been loaded, the field personnel will remove an installation from a basket of locks. The system records only "reading lock A" and yet does not complete the business closed loop. It needs to verify at least which gate the lock A corresponds to, which shipping order, which loading assignment, and whether the loading review is over. If the lock number is recorded, then the lock is changed temporarily, but the old tie is not removed, it may have been abnormally handed over to the cargo.

It is more prudent to check the load, seal it, read it with a lock number, confirm the gate and hand over the person that makes up the sequence of events. The stoplock should create new records and keep the reason for the replacement relationship. After history is covered, the system, while showing the "current lock" is lost in its ability to follow up.

Electronic evidence has boundaries. It doesn't make it any different from the whole picture of reality.

What do the systems see? A judgement that can be upheld. What do we need to verify?
Read the given lock number at an intersection The sign was read at the time. Whether to install at target gate, correct task binding
Device report unloaded or locked There are state changes to explain Reasons for authorized operations, equipment malfunctions or physical anomalies
Unread lock at arrival This check is not complete Potential for containment, direction, damage, substitution and loss

Therefore, the "not receiving an anomaly" should not be changed to "transport is always normal." The power drops, communication breaks down, and the station is swept off, creating different types of data gaps. The platform should show the time and place of the last credible observation and allow for re-checking to remain visible.

The real problem is the abnormality, not the normal demonstration.

The pilot project can select a line with clear and cross-responding responsibilities, active exercise of normal lock-opening, unauthorised change of state, temporary relocking of lock-up, failure to read and write, failure to write, after the offline pass and cancellation of shipping orders. Each case asks: Who receives the alarm, who has the right to release, what evidence is needed, who reviews the dispute? Only the alarm, not the person who disposes of it, tends to just move the question from the scene onto the screen.

The event interface should also prevent double-off between multiple submissions. Once the weak web is restored, a sealing record may be reissued; the server should identify and retest the original record according to the mission and event identifier, and avoid disguise of late uploads into real time by overlaying the time. The program involved in security authentication should also verify whether chip, solidware, key and backstage constitute a complete design, and the normal readable number does not in itself amount to a proof against copying.

When evaluating the benefits, we'll include false alarms and manual retreats.

It is recommended to record the completion rate for each ticket, abnormally closed loop time, number of times to change locks, number of times to repeat alarms and time to manually re-record. The denominator should be a real handover, not how many data the reader returns cumulatively. The latter may be large because of repeated reading, but it cannot prove that the transport chain is completely covered.

The RFID electronic lock is a good solution to the problem of unclear liability for the transfer, the sealing hand being mistaken, and the fragmentation of abnormal evidence. If the line does not have a stable handover process, people are not entitled to handle anomalies, but should fix it first. The system that deserves to be built is to make one vote of disputed transport possible, rather than making each lock look smart on the map.

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